Projectability is most often discussed in connection with the distinction between "genuine" and "Goodmanized" predicates. But questions about projectability arise for the most mundane of hypotheses and predicates where not the slightest hint of Goodmanian trickery is present. And there are a number of different concepts of projectability, each corresponding to a different problem of induction. Some of these problems are not only solvable but have actually been solved, solved in the sense that interesting sets of sufficient and/or necessary conditions for projectability have been found. In some cases the conditions are so mild that a coherent inductive skepticism is hard to maintain, whereas in other cases the conditions are so demanding that skepticism seems to be the only attractive alternative. Again, in some of the cases Goodmanian considerations are the key; in others they are irrelevant.
The purpose of this note is to provide a classification scheme for the various senses of projectability that will reveal what is at stake in the corresponding problems of induction. A useful beginning can be made by recalling the twofold classification Russell offered in Human Knowledge:
Induction by simple enumeration is the following principle: "given any number of a's which have been found to be jS's, and no a which has been found to be not a 0, then the two statements: (a) 'the next a will be a /5,' (b) 'all as are /3's,' both have a probability which increases as n increases and approaches certainty as a limit as n approaches infinity." I shall call (a) "particular induction" and (b) "general induction." 1 Each of Russell's categories needs to be refined. Under particular or instance induction I will recommend a fourfold partition, first distinguishing weak and strong senses according as the induction is on the next instance or the next m instances, and second distinguishing two ways of taking the limit as the number n of instances increases toward infinity according as we march into the future with the accumulating instances or stand pat in the present and reach further and further back into the past for more instances. Under general or hypothesis induction I will recommend a twofold partition depending on whether the hypothesis is a simple generalization on observed instances or a theoretical hypothesis that outruns the data. The upshot is a collection of six problems of induction with six rather different solutions.
Instance Induction: Marching into the Future
Only nonstatistical hypotheses will be considered. Further, it is assumed that the "instances" £,, i = 1, 2, 3,. . ., of the hypothesis H are deductive consequences of H and the "background evidence" B (i.e., //, B \-£i). If you want H to be a universal conditional, e.g., (Vx)(Px D Qx), take instances to be (Pa D Qa) and the like; or else let B state that all the objects examined are P's and take instances to be (Pa & Qa) and the like. From the previous results we know that a sufficient condition for both weak and strong projectability of "P" in the future-moving sense is that
Thus, contrary to what is sometimes suggested, definitions 3 and 4 do not serve to separate "grue" from "green," 5 except on what I take to be the wholly implausible assumption that the universal generalization of the one but not the other receives a zero prior.
When is (C) necessary as well as sufficient for future-moving instance induction? The limit ofPr(Pai&. .. &Pa n /B) as n goes to infinity exists and is independent of the order in which the instances are taken. Further, we know that (4) lim But to assure that (A) lim we need to assume what Kolmogorov calls an axiom of continuity. 6 Then (C) is a necessary condition for strong projectability of "P" in the future-moving sense; for (5) lim lim and if (A) but -i (C), this limit is not 1 independently of how m and m go to infinity; e.g., first taking the limit as m -> oo gives 0.
(C) is not a necessary condition for weak future-moving projectability of "P." Carnap's systems of inductive logic provide examples where (C) and strong future-moving projectability fail but weak future-moving projectability holds. However, the point can be illustrated in a more general way, independently of Carnap's c-function apparatus.
7 Suppose that Pr is exchangeable for "P" over the a\s, i.e., for every m (E) where + P indicates that either P or -i P may be chosen and {a,' } is any permutation of the a[S in which all but a finite number are left fixed. If (E) holds, De Finetti's representation theorem gives
where ^ is a normed probability measure on the unit interval 0 < 0 < 1. 8 Choosing /A to be the uniform measure gives (6) Thus, (C) fails. But (7) which is Laplace's rule of succession, so that "P" is weakly projectable in the future-moving sense. Under (E) the necessary and sufficient condition for the failure of weak future-moving projectability is that
The label (CM) is supposed to indicate a closed-minded attitude, for (CM) is equivalent to the condition that |ii([0,0*]) = 1 for some 0* < 1, ruling out the possibility that an instance of "P" can have a probability greater than 0*. The extreme case of closed-mindedness is represented by a pi concentrated on a point; for example, if jii( {1/2)) = 1, then each instance of "P" is assigned a probability of 1/2 independently of all other instances, so that the user of the resulting Pr function is certain (in the sense of second order probability) of the probability of an instance of "P," so certain that no number of other instances of "P" will ever change her mind. The probability measure in Wittgenstein's Tractatus had this character.
9
To summarize: Suppose that you give a nonzero prior probability to the hypothesis that the sun always rises. Then the rising of the sun is strongly futuremoving projectable over the series of days. On the other hand, suppose that you are absolutely certain that the sun won't always rise. It is still possible for your belief that the sun will rise tomorrow to approach certainty as your experience of new dawns increases without bound. But, assuming (A), it is not possible for your belief that the sun will rise on any number of tomorrows to approach certainty as your experience of new dawns increases without bound.
Another sense of projectability for predicates sometimes used in the literature 10 is codified in DEFINITION 5. Relative to B, "P" is somewhat future-moving projectable over the sequence of individuals a\, «2, • • • iff for each n > 0, Under exchangeability (E), "P" is somewhat future-moving projectable unless the measure ^(9) is completely concentrated on some value of 6, as can be seen by applying the Cauchy-Schwartz inequality. Thus, the case of a closed-minded /x. which is not completely closed-minded provides an example where "P" is somewhat but not weakly future-moving projectable. And in general there is no guarantee that projectability in the sense of definition 5 will have the limiting properties postulated in definitions 3 and 4.
Humean skepticism with respect to future-moving instance induction, weak or strong, stands on unstable ground. If Pr((Vi)Pai/B) is any positive real number, no matter how small, future-moving instance induction must take place, like it or not. Setting Pr((Vi)PailB) = 0 avoids strong future-moving instance induction, but if past experience, as codified in B, does not record a negative instance, then Pr((3i)-iPa\IB) = 1 says that there is absolute certainty that the future will produce a negative instance, a not very Humean result.
Humeans can escape between the horns of this dilemma either by refusing to conform their degrees of belief to the axioms of probability or else by refusing to assign degrees of belief at all. The first tack is unattractive in view of the 'Dutch book' and other arguments that promote the axioms of probability as rationality constraints on degrees of belief.
11 The second tack seems to lead to something closer to catatonia than to active skepticism.
Instance Induction: Standing Pat in the Present
While Reaching into the Past
There is a second way of taking the limit as the number of instances accumulates without bound, a way that is, perhaps, more directly relevant to Hume's classic problem of induction. To explain it, suppose as before that //, B \-E\ , but now let / range over all the integers so that we have a doubly infinite sequence of instances. . . Corresponding senses of projectability apply to predicates. (Of course, the future versus the past direction of time is not the issue here; rather the point concerns whether the "next instance" lies in the direction in which the limit of accumulating evidence is taken.) For the future-moving sense of instance induction to be valid it was sufficient that the prior probability of the universal generalization be nonzero. But not so for past-reaching instance induction. Consider the predicates "P" and "P*," where the latter is defined by
We can assign nonzero priors to both H: (V/)Paj and to //*: (Vi)P*cn but obviously not even weak past-reaching projectability is possible for both "P" and "P*." For P*fl n is logically equivalent to Pa n for n < 1990 and to -\Pa n for n > 1990, so that if
Thus, unlike definitions 3 and 4, definitions 6 and 7 do distiguish between "grue" and "green" in the sense that both cannot be projectable in the past-reaching sense. But the cut between past-reaching nonprojectable versus projectable predicates does not necessarily correspond to the cut between Goodmanlike versus nonGoodmanlike predicates (see sec. 5 below).
If exchangeability (E) holds for "P" then past-reaching projectability for "P" is equivalent to future-moving projectability. Thus, if we assign nonzero priors to both (\/i)Pai and (Vj)P*fli, exchangeability cannot hold for both "P" and for "P*." Or if exchangeability does hold for both, then for at least one of them the measure ^ in De Finetti's representation must be closed-minded. This is more or less what one would have expected since in the present setting exchangeability functions as one expression of the principle of the uniformity of nature.
12 What is interesting is that there is a principle of induction-weak and strong future-moving instance induction-whose validity does not depend on a uniformity of nature postulate. Furthermore, uniformity of nature in the guise of exchangeability is precisely what one does not want in order to make true some of the truisms of confirmation theory, such as that variety of evidence can be more important that sheer amount of evidence. Return to formula (1) used to prove Jeffreys's theorem and note that the more slowly for given n the factor Pr(E n + i/Ei&. . .&E n &B) goes to 1, the smaller the denominator on the righthand side of (1) and, thus, the larger the posterior probability of H. Intuitively, the more various (and nonexchangeable) the EJS, the slower the approach to 1 is. Perhaps this intuition can be turned round to yield an analysis of variety of evidence, but I will not pursue the matter here.
Crudely put, the problem of future-moving instance induction concerns whether the future will resemble the future, while the problem of past-reaching instance induction concerns whether the future will resemble the past. The former problem can be posed and solved without much attention to the form the resemblance is supposed to take; for any predicate, "genuine" or "Goodmanized," will, irresistibly, lend itself to future-moving projectability as long as a nonzero prior is assigned to the universal generalization on the predicate, and there is no danger of being led into inconsistency as long as the initial probability assignments are coherent. But the latter problem, as Goodman's examples have taught us, requires scrupulous attention to the form of resemblance if inconsistencies are to be avoided. Future-moving instance induction leaves only narrow and unstable ground for the skeptic to stand on. By contrast, past-reaching instance induction provides the grounds for but does not require a blanket skepticism, while the strongest form of general induction virtually begs for skepticism. It is to general induction that I now turn. 1, 2, 3 The price for weak projectability of His low; but what we buy may be unexciting since there is no guarantee that the increases that come with increasing instances will boost the probability toward 1. Thus, we also formulate DEFINITION 9. Relative to B, the hypothesis H is strongly projectable on the basis of the instance E\, £2,. .. iff lim n->c»
General Induction Still assuming that H, B \-£",-, i =

Claim: His not strongly projectable if there is an alternative hypothesis H' such that (i) B I 1(H&H'), (ii)H', B \-E { for all i and (iii) Pr(H'IB) > 0.
Proof. Assume that H is strongly projectable and assume that there is an H' satisfying (i) and (ii) and show that (iii) is violated. By Bayes's theorem and (ii), By (i), Pr(H/X&B) + Pr(H'/X&B) < 1. So if H is strongly projectable, the limit as n -> oo of Pr(H'/Ei&. . .&£"&£) is 0. Thus, taking the limit in (10) gives Philosophers of science routinely claim that any amount of data can be covered by many, possibly an infinite, number of hypotheses. Strictly speaking, this is not so if it means that there are many //'s satisfying (i) and (ii) above. Take the £j to be Pat and take H to be (Vi)Pcn. Then H admits of no logically consistent alternatives satisfying (i) and (ii) and, hence,
no alternatives satisfying (i)-(iii). Such lowly empirical generalizations escape the above negative result, and if (A) and (C) hold, so does strong projectability. For if (A) and (C), then lim
We can also consider a doubly infinite sequence of individuals. . . ,. . .and demand strong projectability in the past-reaching sense, i.e.,
DEFINITION 10. Relative to B, (Vi)Pai is strongly projectable in the pastreaching sense iff for all n lim
If (C) holds along with exchangeability and the natural generalization of (A), viz., for all n then definition 10 is satisfied. In effect, exchangeability has the flavor of "If you've seen an infinite number of them, you've seen them all." Once we move beyond direct observational generalizations to theories that outrun the data, it is surely true that there are many rival theories that cover the same data. For such a theory strong projectability on the basis of its instances is impossible unless the dice have been completely loaded against all the alternatives.
We might then hope for a more modest form of projectability, as given in (10) with n = N. If H is (r, s) projectable and there is an H' satisfying (i) and (ii), the left side of (10) is greater than 1. But if (iii) holds, the right-hand side is less than or equal to 1.
For this more modest form of general induction to work we don't have to load the dice completely against all rivals covering the same instances, but we still need to load them.
Although the Bayesian apparatus has shown itself to be very useful in clarifying issues about confirmation and induction, it proves to be idle machinery when it comes to testing nonstatistical scientific theories. Such a theory can have its probability boosted above .5 and toward 1 by finding evidence that falsifies rival theories. But in such cases simple eliminative induction suffices; and when eliminative induction does not work, then neither does Bayesianism, unless the dice have been loaded against all rival theories.
Russell on Induction
Having begun with Russell's formulation of the problem of induction, I now want to return to Human Knowledge to see what progress Russell made on the problem. Given that the book is the product of one of the great minds of Western philosophy, the results are more than a little disappointing. Here are four interrelated reasons for disappointment.
First, Russell did not distinguish between the past-reaching and future-moving senses of instance induction. When he gets specific about what instance induction means he tends to make it sound like the future-moving variety, as in "Let a\, a2,. . ., a n be the hitherto observed member of at, all of which have been found to be j8, and let a n + i be the next member of a."
13 This is the easiest and most neatly "solvable" case, but Russell makes little progress toward its "solution," despite the fact that some of his reasoning is close to that later used by Jeffreys 14 to prove that the probability of the next instance approaches 1 (see the third comment below). One can speculate that Russell, having already decided that the validity of induction requires an extralogical principle not justified by experience, was not on the lookout for the kind of result provided by Jeffreys and Huzurbazar. Second, Russell recognized Goodman's "new problem" of induction; and then again he didn't. He did because he used examples of Goodmanized hypotheses (see the fourth comment) and because he says that /3
must not be what might be called a "manufactured" class, i.e., one defined partly by extension. In the sort of cases contemplated in inductive inference, j8 is always a class known by intension, but not in extension except as regards observed members. .. and such other members of j8, not members of a as may happen to have been observed. 15 But then again he didn't because he didn't recognize that there is a distinction to be drawn between past-reaching and future-moving instance induction and that it is only for the former that Goodman's "new problem" arises. 16 Third, Russell formulated the problem of induction in part V. Part VI discusses Keynes's attack on general induction. Assuming as before that //, B (-£,, we can apply a result from Keynes's Treatise on Probability 11 to conclude that Set Pr(HIB) =£ 0, the posterior probability of//will go to 1 in the limit as n -» oo if q n^> 0. Russell comments:
If there is any number less than 1 such that all the (2's are less than this number, then the product of n Q's is less than the nth power of this number, and therefore tends to zero as n increases.
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The reasoning here is similar to that used to prove Jeffreys's theorem on futuremoving instance induction, but Russell does not make the connection. When H is a simple empirical generalization, e.g., (Vi)Pat, and the Ei's are Pa\, Russell says that "it is difficult to see how this condition [as quoted above] can fail for empirical material." 19 When i runs from 1 to +00 and the continuity axiom (A) holds, the factor Pr(Pa\&. . .&Pa n /B&-i (VOPfli) in the denominator of the Keynes formula (13) must go to 0. But when / ranges from -oo to +00 and the instances accumulate in the past-reaching sense, this factor cannot be shown to go to 1, unless by "empirical material" Russell means material for which exchangeability or the like holds.
Fourth, the difficulty with general induction to theoretical hypotheses can be seen from a simplified version of Keynes's formula, viz.,
and THENIF
Suppose that Pr(HIB) is nonzero but small. Then in order for Pr(H/E&B) to be large, E must be such that it would be improbable if H were false (Pr(E/-\ H&B) small). But as Russell notes, it may be hard to find such evidence. Take, for sake of illustration, H to be Newton's theory of gravitation and E to be the discovery of Neptune. Then there are many alternatives to H "which would lead to the expectation of Neptune being where it was"; for example, take H' to be the hypothesis that Newton's law of gravitation holds up to the time of discovery of Neptune but not afterward. 20 Russell scores a point with his Goodmanian illustration, but the point obscures the fact that the general problem arises even when Goodmanian alternatives are not at issue.
Prospects for a Theory of Projectability
From the perspective of the preceding approach some philosophical theories of projectability appear to be confused as to purpose, or false, or both. Consider the most ambitious and widely discussed philosophical theory of projectability, Goodman's entrenchment theory. 21 Conditions couched in terms of relative entrenchment of predicates seem irrelevant to some of the questions of projectability distinguished here and inadequate to others. For example, any hypothesis, no matter how ill entrenched its predicates, is weakly projectable on the basis of its positive instances if it has a nonzero prior-that is, a theorem of probability. To claim that H gets a zero prior if it conflicts with an H' that is supported, unviolated, and unexhausted, that uses better-entrenched predicates than those of H, and that conflicts with no still better entrenched hypothesis, is to make a claim that is constantly belied by actual scientific practice where new hypotheses using new predicates are given a "fighting chance" of a nonnegligible prior. On the other hand, strong projectability of a hypothesis, even if all of its predicates are supremely well entrenched, may be provably impossible if rival hypotheses are given a fighting chance, even when the rivals use ill-entrenched predicates. The most obvious application of the entrenchment notion is to what I called the problem of past-reaching instance induction. Of course, the general problem is independent of the direction of time and, more importantly, of the time dimension, for parallel problems arise for projecting from one side of a division of the range of a nontemporal parameter into the other side (say, from cases where (vie) < < 1 to cases where v is near c). But as Rosenkrantz 22 has emphasized, there are numerous cases in the history of science where scientists project predicates that are unentrenched and that, from the perspective of entrenched theory, appear to be Goodmanized because they agree with the old entrenched predicates to a good degree of approximation in the well-sampled side of the division but diverge on the other side.
It is time to pause to ask what can be expected from a "theory of projectability." A minimalist theory would be established by finding sharp and interesting necessary and sufficient conditions for the various notions of projectability. The results reported here take us only part of the way toward this minimalist goal. But once the goal is reached, what more remains to be done? A more grandiose theory of projectability would, presumably, consist of descriptive and/or normative rules for determining when the conditions developed in the minimalist theory are or ought to be met. The prospects for constructing such a theory with the tools of analytic philosophy seem to me dim.
To make this skeptical conclusion plausible it suffices to focus on cases where we found that projectability turns largely on prior probability considerations. Objectivist accounts of prior probability assignments have been offered by Reichenbach, 23 in terms of frequency counts, by Jaynes, 24 in terms of maximum entropy calculations, and by others. But in every instance there are serious if not crippling difficulties with the proposed method of assignment. 25 Without assigning specific prior probabilities we could seek a theory to justify assigning some nonzero priors to a class of favored hypotheses. Keynes's "principle of limited variety" was designed for just this purpose. In Human Knowledge Russell attacks Keynes's theory (and rightly so, I think). But Russell's own five 'postulates of induction,' designed he says to "provide the antecedent probabilities required to justify induction," 26 are just as unattractive. Separability and continuity of causal lines, common causes for similar structures ranged around a center, etc., have a certain intuitive appeal, but they involve contingent assumptions that may not hold in the actual world if it is anything like what the quantum theory says it is like. For the subjectivist school of probability, as represented by De Finetti and followers, the envisioned theory of projectability would consist of a psychological account of how people in fact distribute initial degrees of belief consistent (hopefully) with the axioms of probability. This is a task for cognitive psychology, not armchair philosophy. Of course, I expect that psychology will find that entrenchment and other considerations suggested by philosophers will play some role in the account, but I do not expect that the account will consist of a neat set of rules of the type envisioned in the philosophical literature.
Goodman has charged that the problem of induction and its solution have been misconceived. I agree, but I think the misconception extends further than Goodman would allow. In any case, it is curious that philosophers have reached for more grandiose theories of projectability before getting a firm grip on minimalist theories. In addition to filling in the gaps in the results reported here, it would be nice to have results based on alternatives to exchangeability. 27 One would also like to have information about how fast the posterior probability increases and whether, as Keynes worried, we are all dead before the value gets anywhere near I. 28 Notes
